Recent studies of decision making have suggested that the poor performance typically demonstrated by traditional decision making research is due not to failures on the part of the human, but failures of the empirical studies to test performance in representative situations. In particular, some researchers have studied how experience in an uncertain environment can improve performance. We describe research designed to test the effect of explicit environmental experience on performance on a rule verification task. Participants performed a rule verification task after receiving related experience in the task environment. Results indicated that performance was very similar to that on traditional tasks of this type, in contrast to research which suggested that knowledge of uncertainty should impact performance.
INTRODUCTION
Researchers have tried to understand human decision making from a variety of perspectives. Traditional theories modeled decision making as a logical process of selecting decision alternatives based on their costs and probabilities of occurrence (e.g., Savage, 1954) . Research in this vein tended to paint a very pessimistic picture of human abilities to make judgments, but did not typically consider how experienced practitioners actually made judgments. The experimental tasks used were not generally representative of real world conditions, consisting of single-shot tasks under static, nofeedback conditions. Thus, the pessimistic view of behavior may be due more to failures of the studies to use representative situations than to failures of the human.
Two alternative approaches to the study of decision making have explicitly addressed the role of experience and environmental context on performance. Research in dynamic or naturalistic decision making (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Pruitt, 1996; Klein, 1996) has held that experienced practitioners are generally proficient decision makers in naturalistic situations, due both to factors in the environment and a high level of experience. A second, new approach to the study of human judgment and decision making, the adaptivity approach, has also explicitly considered the role of experience and environmental factors on performance on traditionally used tasks ( Klayman, 1988 , Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995 Oaksford & Chater, 1994) . This approach considers human decision-making behavior to be successful in naturally occurring environments and has investigated how experience acting in an environment with particular characteristics can lead to predictable judgment behaviors. Studies in this vein have explicitly considered the role environmental factors play on judgments in some traditionally studied tasks.
One task in which researchers from the adaptive tradition have tried to understand performance in terms of relevant environmental characteristics is that of rule verification. Earlier research had suggested that performance on this task was biased with respect to logical rules. The new research suggests instead that performance is not inherently biased, and may in fact be adaptive to the structure of uncertainty present in the task.
In rule verification tasks, people are asked to verify if a rule of the form "If P then Q" is true. Traditionally, this task has been implemented as a card selection task (Wason, 1968) in which people are shown one side of four cards. The cards are designed such that one side of the card provides information about the presence or absence of the rule antecedent (i.e., P or not-P) and the other side provides information about the presence of absence of the consequent (i.e., Q or not-Q). Participants are told to pick the minimum set of cards which will allow the verification of the rule. For the typical card set with faces P, not-P, Q, and not-Q showing, the logical selection set is P and not-Q. In studies by Wason, it was found that participants tended to normatively examine a card they know to be P to see if it was also Q, but nonnormatively examined a card that was Q to see if it was also P. Very few chose to examine cards known to be not-Q. Wason concluded that people have fundamental difficulties when asked to reason with negative or disconfirming information.
. However, later experiments suggested that the underlying probabilistic structure of the situation may better explain participants' actions. Klayman and Ha (1987) proposed that a preference for a "positive test strategy" on the part of participants could explain why participants tend to seek confirming rather than rather than disconfirming evidence when attempting to test a hypothesis. With a positive test strategy, people examine instances generated by a hypothesized rule (P's) to see if they are in fact members of the target class (Q's), or examine instances they know are targets (Q's) to see if they match the hypothesized rule (P's). This in contrast to a negative test strategy, in which targets not generated by the hypothesized rule or which are known not to be targets are examined. Klayman and Ha showed that the utility of these strategies depended on the probabilistic structure of the environment. For example, if the probability of receiving disconfirming evidence with a positive strategy is higher than with a negative test strategy, then a positive test strategy should be preferred. (Kirby, 1994) explicitly tested situations where the probability of targets and the costs and benefits of errors and success were manipulated, in the context of a rule verification through card selection task. Kirby showed how the utility of choosing the not-Q card is proportional to the likelihood that the reverse side of the card will provide disconfirming evidence, which is proportional to the probability of P, when P and Q are independent. Kirby constructed rules in which the proportion of P's relative to not-P's ranged from low to high, and found that participants' selection of not-Q cards increased as the probability of a P increased.
Similarly, Oaksford and Chater (1994) defined the utility of selecting each card in terms of the expected amount of information gained by turning a card. They derived this measure in terms of the probabilities of P or Q occurring and the probability that the rule was true. Using their model, Oaksford and Chater were able to predict patterns of card selection found in many studies.
The adaptive approach implicitly recognizes that people's experience in the environment, through adaptation to certain characteristics such as uncertainty, affects decision making performance. The studies of rule verification tasks considered the role of environmental uncertainty along with experience in the environment on task performance, but did not explicitly test the role of experience. That is, the studies did not provide people with experience in the environment in which they must test a rule or hypothesis, and then examine whether or not this experience with the occurrence of confirming or disconfirming evidence would affect the evidence selected. We designed a multi-part experiment to address this question.
METHOD
Task Environment. The environment used for this experiment is modeled after that of the Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator (AAWC) position in the Combat Information Center of a United States Navy ship. Typically, the AAWC, a naval officer, is responsible for making judgments regarding the identity of unidentified aircraft by gathering information and determining the type of aircraft and its hostile or friendly intent. Participants saw a simulated graphical radar display showing the reported contacts (aircraft), and could interact with the system to obtain information or take actions to identify or control aircraft.
Participants. Participants (19 female and 16 male) were recruited from the student population at the Georgia Institute of Technology and were paid or given class credit for their participation. An analysis of demographic data indicated that participants had similar ages, time in college, and statistics background across conditions. Experiment Overview. To investigate the effects of taskrelevant experience on the rule verification task, a categorization task (identifying aircraft) was used to give participants explicit domain experience. Subsequently, participants performed the rule verification task. The probabilistic structure of the experimental environment was defined by specifying particular cue-criterion relationships linking known aircraft characteristics to unknown aircraft states. These probabilities were used to construct the experimental scenarios used in the categorization task. Then, for the rule verification task, these probabilities were used to identify the probabilities of finding certain types of evidence which could confirm or disconfirm a rule.
Participants spent five, one hour time periods on consecutive days performing this and two related experiments (see Bisantz, 1997 for details). On the first day, participants were trained on the categorization task, and performed the task on the second and third days. On the fourth day, participants performed the rule verification task.
Categorization Task: Aircraft Identification
In this task, participants were asked to identify aircraft (moving at different speeds and directions) appearing on a simulated radar screen as either hostile or friendly. Participants performed the task in one of two environments (Environment 1 and Environment 2), which had different probabilistic cue-criterion relationships (for further details, see Bisantz, 1997) . By performing this task, participants were given experience regarding the probabilistic relationships in the environment, which we hypothesized would affect their performance on the rule verification task. Participants could access up to four cues to help them categorize an aircraft: Identify Friend/Foe (IFF), radar, altitude, and origin. Cue values (one of three possible textual values) were presented in a fixed sequential order (first IFF, then radar, altitude, and origin), as participants asked for them, because the rule verification task assumed that participants had experienced IFF values and their occurrence with hostile or friendly aircraft. Table 1 gives the probabilities that were used to define the types of aircraft which occurred during the experimental scenarios, as well as to define the probabilities of finding certain types of evidence for the rule verification task.
Participants performed eight, ten-minute experimental sessions, in which they had to identify 25 aircraft which appeared simultaneously on the radar screen. They were given . immediate feedback if they identified an aircraft incorrectly, and performance feedback at the session end.
Results. Briefly, results from the identification task indicated that, on average across eight sessions, participants in Environment 1 made initially correct identifications on 85% of attempts, while those in Environment 2 had 67% correct. By the last session, participants in Environment 1 made initially correct identifications on 91% of attempts, while those in Environment 2 had 75% correct.
Rule Verification Task
In the rule verification task, the probabilities of finding certain evidence to verify rules corresponded to the probabilities of different aircraft identity (e.g., hostile or friendly) -cue value (e.g., IFF cue value) pairs. These probabilities correspond to those used in the aircraft identification task.
Experimental Conditions. During the rule verification task, participants were asked to investigate aircraft displayed on a simulated radar screen, to collect evidence which could verify if a rule was true. Participants collected evidence regarding one of the following three rules:
1. If the IFF of an aircraft is Type 1, the aircraft is Friendly. 2. If the IFF of an aircraft is Type 2, the aircraft is Friendly. 3. If the IFF of an aircraft is Type 3, the aircraft is Friendly.
For each rule, there were four categories of aircraft to be investigated, and four aircraft in each category (16 total). For Rule 1, the four categories were: hostile aircraft with unknown IFF (a "not-Q" aircraft), Friendly aircraft with unknown IFF (a "Q" aircraft), aircraft with unknown identity and Type 1 IFF (a "P" aircraft), and aircraft with unknown identity and Type 2 or 3 IFF (a "not-P" aircraft). Thus, participants knew either the aircrafts' IFF (i.e., if the aircraft was a P or a not-P), or the aircrafts' identity (i.e., if the aircraft was a Q or a not-Q). The hostile or friendly status of the aircraft was indicated by the aircraft's color, and the IFF was indicated by its shape.
Categories were similar for Rules 2 and 3, with differences corresponding to the different IFF Types given in the rules.
The intent of these manipulations was to see how prior experience with the aircraft identification task may have influenced participants' selection of aircraft to investigate to confirm or disconfirm the three rules. Logically, to collect evidence to verify Rule 1, participants should have checked aircraft known to be hostile, and those known to have an IFF of Type 1. However, researchers have proposed different theories for how the probabilities of finding evidence should affect performance.
For example, Kirby, (1994) suggested that evidence selection depends normatively on the probability that a card (or aircraft) will provide falsifying evidence (e.g., P and not-Q). For example, one could change the posterior probability of seeing P given not-Q relative to seeing not-P given not-Q. When p(P | not-Q) is low relative to p(not-P | not Q), the chance of finding falsifying evidence by choosing not-Q is low (following Kirby, 1994) . That is, when the probability of an aircraft having an IFF of Type 1, given it is hostile, is lower than the probability of an aircraft having Type 2 or 3 IFF, given it is hostile, the chance of finding falsifying evidence by checking hostile aircraft is reduced. The corresponding probabilities are given in Table 2 . As p(P | hostile) increases relative to p(not-P | hostile) the chance that a hostile aircraft will provide falsifying evidence increases. Thus, people should be more likely to investigate hostile aircraft. Thus, from Table 2 , the frequency with which not-Q, or hostile, aircraft will be investigated should be greatest for those in the Rule 1 condition, followed by Rule 3 and then Rule 2, for participants who had experienced Environment 1. For participants from Environment 2, the frequency with which not-Q, or hostile aircraft, will be investigated should be greatest for participants in the Rule 1 condition, followed by Rule 2 and then 3.
Additionally, as described previously, Klayman and Ha (1987) suggested that people would choose a positive test strategy (i.e., investigate P or Q aircraft) or negative test strategy (i.e., investigate not-P and not-Q aircraft) depending on the relative probability that the strategies could disconfirm the rule. For the first rule condition, with a positive test strategy, the probability of getting disconfirming evidence is Table 2 . Probabilities that aircraft have certain IFF types given they are hostile. As the ratio of these probabilities changes, the efficacy of investigating not-Q aircraft changes. . Figure 1 . Frequency of aircraft investigated by type, for three rule conditions. Environmental conditions are shown separately. There were five participants in the Env 2-Rule 2 group and six participants otherwise. p(not-Q | P). With a negative test strategy, the probability of getting disconfirming evidence is p(P | not-Q). It follows that if the ratio of p(not-Q | P) to p(P | not-Q) is greater than one, a positive test strategy is preferable, otherwise, a negative test strategy is preferable. Based on the ratios from Procedure. Participants used a computer display showing aircraft moving on a simulated radar screen, and interacted with the system using a mouse and keyboard. Generally, the task proceeded as follows. Participants maneuvered patrol aircraft close to the aircraft they wanted to investigate, by changing the speed and direction of the patrol and selected the aircraft they wanted the patrol to investigate. When they were close to the aircraft of interest, they could obtain a report about the aircraft's identity (e.g., hostile or friendly) or its IFF.
After training on the system, participants were given the rule they were supposed to verify, and were told to end the task when they were finished collecting the minimum amount of evidence. The maximum task time was 15 minutes.
Dependent Measures. Participants' actions were logged by the computer. The number of each aircraft type (P, not-P, Q, and not-Q) investigated by participant was extracted. Figure 1 shows the frequency with which each type of aircraft was investigated, by rule type, for both groups of participants (i.e., from Environments 1 and 2 in the aircraft identification task). There were 12 participants in the Rule 1 and Rule 3 conditions, and 11 in the Rule 2 condition. Color and shape were used to indicate the hostile/friendly and IFF status of the aircraft. For the rule "If the aircraft has an IFF of Type 1, then it is friendly," a P aircraft would be a gray circle (unknown identity with IFF of Type 1) while a Q aircraft would be a green square (unknown IFF with friendly identity). Not-P aircraft would be a gray triangle (unknown identity with IFF of Type 2 or 3) and not-Q aircraft would be a red square (unknown IFF with hostile identity).
RESULTS

Frequency of Aircraft Investigation: By Rule
From Figure 1 , participants across the three rule conditions and summed over both environments appeared most likely to investigate P aircraft, followed by Q, not-Q and not-P aircraft. A χ 2 goodness-of-fit test indicated that participants grouped across all conditions investigated aircraft types with different frequency (χ 2 3 = 142.61, α <0.000). This corresponds to the standard finding that participants are most likely to choose P and Q, or "positive" evidence, and less likely to seek the appropriate negative evidence, not-Q (Wason, 1968) .
Additionally, participants seemed less inclined to investigate not-Q, and possibly not-P aircraft, in the Rule 3 condition. This would be an interesting finding, since it Table 3 . Conditional probability an aircraft is hostile, given an IFF, and the likelihood of an IFF type, given it is hostile. As the ratio of these probabilities changes, so does the efficacy of a positive or negative test strategy. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, 1998, pp. 281 -285. . corresponds to predictions based on the theories of Klayman and Ha (1987) . From above, the different probabilities of Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3 IFF (one for each rule condition) would result in Rule 3 participants being less likely to use a negative test strategy than Rule 1 or 2 participants, and more likely to use a positive strategy. Thus, if these theories were correct, those in the Rule 3 condition would be more likely to check P or Q aircraft than participants in the Rule 1 or 2 conditions, and less likely to investigate not-P or not-Q aircraft.
To test for this possibility, further categorical tests were performed. A corrected frequency measure (necessary due to the unequal number of participants) was computed by generating an additional frequency data point for each class of aircraft for the Rule 2-Environment-2 group, based on the mean frequency for that group. The Goodman and Kruskal-tau statistic (τ = 0.010, α = 0.387), computed based on these corrected frequencies, did not indicate a significant relationship between the rule being investigated and the frequency with which types of aircraft were investigated. Thus, hypotheses based on results of Klayman and Ha were not supported.
There was no significant difference in the patterns with which aircraft were investigated based on the environment participants had experienced during the identification task (τ = 0.008, α = 0.179).
Frequency of Aircraft Investigation: By Rule and Environment
Predictions based on results given by Kirby (1994) indicate that the relative frequency with which participants investigated not-Q aircraft should depend on both the rule condition and environment condition. However, there was no indication of a relationship between the rule-environment combination and the frequency with which aircraft types were investigated (τ =0.028, α =0.299).
DISCUSSION
Participants, grouped across rule and environment, were most likely to investigate P aircraft, followed by Q, not-Q and not-P aircraft. Even given the large differences in task instantiation between the dynamic computerized task presented here and the traditional card selection task, results are most similar to traditional research on card selection tasks, in which people were unlikely to select the appropriate evidence (P and not-Q). The predicted dependence of selection on the combination of rule and environment based on results provided by Kirby was not supported. Although there was some indication that participants verifying Rule 3 were less likely to use a negative test strategy (choose not-P and not-Q aircraft) than participants verifying Rule 1 and Rule 2, as predicted based on theories of Klayman and Ha, these differences were not supported statistically.
Thus, these findings did not support theories that linked experience with environmental uncertainty to evidence selection, in a situation in which participants were given experience in the uncertain environment rather than told of the probabilities of finding evidence in the problem. This result is in contrast to previous empirical research (Kirby, 1994) , or hypotheses (Klayman & Ha, 1987) which suggested that knowledge of uncertainty should impact strategies for evidence selection. However, this study differed from previous research because participants could learn about the probabilities of finding evidence through experience. Kirby and Klayman and Ha based their analyses on assumptions about people's real world experience, or information presented in verification problems. Therefore, the results from this study seem to indicate that people may need more extensive experience with environmental uncertainty, in this case the chances of finding evidence, than was provided in this experiment. Alternatively, the effect may require that people are made aware of the different probabilities directly, as Kirby did, through information presented in the problem.
CONCLUSIONS
Recent research has suggested that performance on rule verification tasks should be affected by the probabilities of finding relevant evidence. The present experiment was designed to extend this research in order to test the effects of explicit, task-related experience on performance on a task in which participants had to verify a rule. Participants performed a rule verification task after receiving related experience by categorizing aircraft in the dynamic task environment. Experimental results did not support theories that linked experience with environmental uncertainty to evidence selection, perhaps due to differences in this task with those tested previously with respect to the presentation of probabilities directly, or because participants did not have enough task related experience. Methodologically, this experiment provides an example of how the effect of related experience in the task environment on judgment performance can be investigated. It may be fruitful to apply this approach to other decision-making tasks, to see how experience with environmental uncertainty might impact performance on a range of tasks.
